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LAw-Editorial Discretion Over
Public Television-Muir v. Alabama Educational
Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983)
CONSTITUTIONAL

The United States' economic dependence on oil imports has
led to reactions in unexpected places. A recent Fifth Circuit decision dealt with the first amendment issues raised by viewers' attempts to compel two public television stations to air a cancelled
program critical of Saudi Arabian culture.' Public television's decision-makers should not be held hostage by fear of upsetting volatile Middle Eastern politics. First amendment principles cannot
be compromised by intimidation. But, if public television editors
makes a mistake, what remedy is appropriate? Does the first
amendment invalidate the decision or should the political process
remove the decision-maker?
The issues addressed by this note arose from an editorial decision which had strong political overtones. The novel aspects are
whether public television is a governmental entity and how the
first amendment analysis inverts when the "speaker" has decided
to remain silent and the government is the speaker rather than the
suppressor. Does the private citizen's right to see impose affirmative responsibility on the government to program what he wants to
see?
FACTS

Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission2 arose
after the Alabama Educational Television Commission 3 (AETC)
cancelled Death of a Princess,4 a documentary-drama of the
events which culminated in the public execution of a Saudi AraI. Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); [hereinafter cited as Muir Ill.
2. Id.
3. The AETC was organized under ALA. CODE § 16-7-1 (1975) and has statewide
duties for controlling educational television stations. The agency is funded through the
state special education trust fund and matching funds from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting. Id. at 1036.
4. The show was one of a thirteen part series called World. It was funded through
the station program cooperative and produced as a joint venture of WGBH-TV, a public
broadcast station in Boston, Massachusetts, and ATV Network of London, England. See
Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1036.
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bian princess for her adultery with a commoner.5 The program
had been scheduled and announced when the decision to cancel
was made, because Alabamians fearing retaliation against Americans in Saudi Arabia protested to the Commission.' In general,
the United States did not want to jeopardize good relations with
the oil exporter. The film had already created tension in world
politics; Saudi Arabia temporarily recalled its Ambassador to
England in protest of the film's showing in England.7
The suit in Muir8 was brought by disgruntled viewers who
had planned to watch the cancelled program, and sought to compel the AETC, through injunction, to air the program as scheduled. Relief was denied in the district court.9
KUHT-TV in Houston, Texas, a public station' ° operated by
the University of Houston also decided" to cancel Death of a

5. Muir I, 688 F.2d at 1036.
6. Id. The chairman of the AETC, Jacob Walker, stated: "[BIroadcast[ing] of the
program could expose Alabama citizens in the Middle East to physical assault or property
damage." Id. at 1054 (Johnson, J.,dissenting).
The propriety of the decision is not a matter considered here. Suffice it to say that the
justification of the AETC is unpersuasive to this author. The decision was blatantly political. The issue discussed here is the power to cancel Death of a Princess, not the propriety
of the decision.
7. Id. at 1053.
8. 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Muir I].
9. See Muir 1, 656 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1981). The trial judge was J. Foy
Guin, whose unreported decision is summarized: (1)The likelihood of success on the merits
was low. (2) The first amendment protects broadcasters' decisions whether public or private. (3) The plaintiffs have no right of access and, therefore, no right to compel the
programming.
10. See Barnstone v. University of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670, 672 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Barnstone I](Fifty percent of the station's funds are appropriated by
the State of Texas).
11. The decision to cancel was made by Patrick J. Nicholson, the administrative
head of the station, who had never made a programming decision in his seventeen years in
the position. Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 674. Programming responsibility was ordinarily
delegated to James Bauer, general manager, and Virginia Memre, programming director.
Nicholson reviewed the film after a notice warning of the controversial material from PBS
was called to his attention. Id. at 673. Neither of the ordinary programmers agreed with
Nicholson's decision. Id. at 674.
Nicholson had the authority to make the decision and on this occasion felt the circumstances required intervention. In a press release he stated as his reasons for cancellation,
"strong and understandable objections by the government of Saudi Arabia at a time when
the mounting crisis in the Middle East, our long friendship with the Saudi government and
U.S. national interest all point to the need to avoid exacerbating the situation." Id.
Additionally, the district court found four possible reasons for the decision-all either
arbitrary or blatantly political.
(1)The film was in bad taste. (2) The public might believe the docu-drama was true.
(3) The University through its open university program had tailored an individual curriculum for a distant cousin of the executed princess. (4) The University had economic ties
with major oil companies with large holdings in the Middle East. Id. at 675. Compare,
note 6, supra.
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Princess. Barnstone v. University of Houston,2 which was consolidated with Muir I for the en banc rehearing, was decided in
Texas13 shortly after Muir was decided in Alabama. The issues
were identical. Disappointed viewers also brought Barnstone; however, the district court granted relief,1" which led to a series of
appeals 15 finally laid to rest by Muir II.
STATE ACTION

Before reaching the merits of the first amendment claims in
the Muir cases, each court grappled with the threshold state action issue. The implications of the government's entering mass media are far-reaching: may government consistent with the principle of liberty embodied in the first amendment, participate in the
marketplace of ideas?
A.

Government Involvement Through Regulation and Funding

During the infancy of electromagnetic communications, government made a fundamental choice to regulate rather than own
the airwaves.'" Government action was necessary because radio
technology was primitive and competition for airspace was keen,
resulting in a chaotic overlap; the spectrum was inefficient without
regulation." Through regulation,' 8 the government sought to
avoid the inherent problems of government ownership, yet gain
some order for private sector use. In effect, Congress established a
12. 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Barnstone I1].
13. Barnsione 1, 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
14. Id. at 692.
15. The history of this litigation is complex. For the sake of clarity a synopsis is
given: (1) Barnstone v. University of Houston, 487 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Injunction granted compelling KUHT-TV to show Death of a Princess).
(2) Order of the Fifth Circuit No. 80-1527 (May 12, 1980) (The court stayed the
injunction on the condition that the program be taped for possible airing after a judicial
decision).
(3) Barnstone v. University of Houston, 446 U.S. 1318 (1980) (Justice Powell refused
to vacate the order of the Fifth Circuit).
(4) Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (After remand a trial on the
merits was held and the court ordered Death of a Princess to be shown within thirty days).
(5) Order of the Fifth Circuit No. 81-2011 (January 14, 1981) (The Fifth Circuit
stayed the order of the district court until an appeal could be heard).
(6) Barnstone II, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981) (The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court decision).
(7) Muir II, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (Barnstone 11 consolidated and heard en
banc with Muir I; the court upheld its reversal of the district court).
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377, 395 (1969).
17. Id. at 375-76.
18. Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162. The Act was
later codified and often amended under Title 47 U.S.C.
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public trust in the licensees 19 implemented by a policy of fairness
in content.2 0 The actual regulation was to be accomplished
through the Federal Communications Commission,2 1 which was to
oversee 22 the phenomenon. The agency could devote the requisite
expertise 23 with the public interest as its paratime to developing
24
mount concern.
Commercial broadcasting, because of popular tastes and the
profit motive, did not fully meet the public need. The educational
potential of television was unexplored. 25 Because these needs were
not being met, Congress deviated significantly from the regulation
model. Public radio and television 21 were created. Both public and
private licensees were regulated in the same way. 27
Funding public television has been a persistent dilemma: how
could government support a broadcast media with taxes, 28 and, at
the same time, avoid claims of censorship? The Carnegie Report
of 196729 gave a proposed solution. Its theme was the insulation of
public television from state action concurrent with governmental
19. Muir I1, 688 F.2d at 1040 (citing Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581
F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
20. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377. Compare Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974). There is no fairness doctrine for private electronic communications. This points
up the disparate treatment which the latter has received: courts are more circumspect concerning electronic media because the finite technology and governmental licensing requirements erect entrance barriers, whereas anyone may print a newspaper.
This rationale is outdated and incorrect. First, modern advances in technology have
rapidly expanded the technological capability of electronic media. Second, to be a newspaper with a circulation of any consequence requires a large capital investment. The entrance
barrier is de facto just as high.
See also Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S.
94, 148-70 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas saw regulation of private
electronic media as no different from regulating the written press. He would have limited
governmental regulation to the technology of electronics, its only really unique
characteristic.
21. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
22. See Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1047. (The FCC has authority to review licensees periodically, sua sponte or on request).
23. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385. The courts have traditionally deferred to the FCC; it
is reviewed only under the substantial evidence standard.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383.
25. See generally Alexander, Public Television and the "Ought" of Public Policy,
1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 35.
26. Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 680 (Radio frequencies reserved in 1939; television
in 1952).
27. Accuracy In Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
28. Initially there was no direct funding; however, the Educational Broadcast Facilities Act of 1962 provided grants to build and equip public stations. This marks the first
conjunction of ownership and regulation. The Act did not alleviate the funding problems.
See Barnstone 1, 514 F. Supp. at 680-81.
29. Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Public Television: A Program
for Action (1967) [hereinafter cited as Carnegie Report].
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funding. Congress passed legislation based on the Carnegie Report, 30 which sought to bring television to the "full service of
man." 31 The Report envisioned public television as a competitive
alternative to the commercial networks with program offerings
governed not by commercial necessity but by dedication to cultural and educational development and public service.32 It is, as
Judge Rubin says in Muir H,33 geared to a more sophisticated
audience.
The legislation, following the recommendation of the Carnegie Report, created a private, non-profit corporation through
which substantial government funds could be channeled yet would
allow the government to remain isolated from political involvement and the concomitant first amendment problems. 34 The most
salient feature in the system3 5 was the non-delegable, mandatory
autonomy for programming discretion.36
Congress failed to enact one provision of the Carnegie Re-

30. Congress implemented the Carnegie Report through the Public Television Act of
1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99 (1976).
31. Carnegie Report at 13.
32. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 37. The theme of one section of the report was
drawn from E.B. White:
Noncommercial television should address itself to the idea of excellence, not
the idea of acceptability-which is what keeps commercial television from
climbing the staircase. I think television should be the visual counterpart of
the literary essay, should arouse our dreams, satisfy our hunger for beauty,
take us on journeys, enable us to participate in events, present great drama
and music, explore the sea and the sky and the woods and the hills.
Carnegie Report at 13.
33. 688 F.2d at 1050.
34. See Note, Editorial Discretion of State Public Broadcasting Licensees, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1161, 1162-67 (1982). (The author gives an excellent discussion of the
political history of public television and the attenuated distinctions between the public interest and political intervention).
35. See Carnegie Report at 36.
36. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (g)(1)(B).
No license shall be granted to a television broadcast station having any contract agreement or understanding express or implied with a network organization which, with respect to programs offered or already contracted for pursuant to an affiliation contract, prevents or hinders the station from (1)
rejecting or refusing network programs which the station reasonably believes
to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable or contrary to the public interest or (2)
substituting a program which, in the station's opinion, is of greater
importance.
47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (e). See also Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 682 (The court recognized
the aim of Congress as being local autonomy).
Also, Congress proscribed political advocacy on the network. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (0(3)
(1976). Cf., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 547 F. Supp. 379, reconsideredon jurisdictional grounds, 460 U.S. 1010 (1983).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4:133

port, the excise tax on television sales.3 7 The tax was to have supplied steady funding on a non-appropriative basis. This omission
undermined public television's independence-consequently, there
has been a lack of definition of authority, especially in program
content.3 8 Subsequent developments and needs have led to modifications in the public television structure. 39 The result is a funding
cloverleaf which, followed to its end, finds public television hopelessly entangled with government action.
B.

The State Action Decision in Muir H

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting funded Death of a
Princess, at least partially with public funds.4 0 Muir II tested the
congressional system's efficacy for eliminating state action.
Justice Douglas' dicta in Columbia Broadcasting System v.
Democratic National Committee,4 1 a decision involving a private
licensee's denial of time for political advocacy, foreshadowed the
problems raised in Muir II. The Supreme Court, in an analytically difficult case which resulted in several opinions, held that
private licensees had discretion over their programming.4 2
Justice Douglas, concurring, said:

37. See Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for
Public Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1123, 1155 (1974).
38. Id. at 1156-64. A struggle resulted when the corporation tried to exercise content
control over PBS (See infra note 39). The tension seemed to reach a pinnacle in 1973. A
compromise was reached whereby a review system was established calling for a committee
appointed by CPB and PBS to decide any controversy regarding a program's objectivity.
Id. at 1157-58. When PBS had program control, disputes arose concerning political satirism and, in another program, frontal nudity in a ballet. See generally Chase, Public Broadcasting and the Problem of Government Influence: Towards a Legislative Solution, 9 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 64 (1975). See also Note, supra note 34, at 1166 n.33.
39. The station interconnection system established by Congress, 47 U.S.C. § 396
(h)(2), had become the primary source of program production due to a lack of funding at
the local level. See Canby, supra note 37. To help alleviate these problems a third organization called the Station Program Cooperative (SPC) was formed. See Barnstone I, 514 F.
Supp. at 672-73.
The mechanics of the SPC are roundabout. Through this organization the CPB grants
money directly to stations to use consistently with the local autonomy concept. A producer
introduces his program to PBS, which makes up a catalogue of possible program listings.
PBS then sends the catalogue to its member stations. The local stations each vote on
whether they wish to participate in the funding of the programs. If enough vote to fund the
program PBS airs the programs via satellite and those stations that voted to share the cost
of the programs have the right to show the program. Id. This funding system is not completely ineffective; but it offers only repetitive protection since both Congress and the Station Users Agreement mandate local control. See Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1036 n.4.
40. See Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1036.
41. 412 U.S. 94, 149 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 120.
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[Public Broadcasting] is said not to be an agency or establishment
of the United States Government. Yet, since it is a creature of Congress whose management is in the hands of a Board named by the
President and approved by the Senate, it is difficult to see why it is
not a federal agency engaged in operating a "press" as that word is
used in the First Amendment .... The Government as owner and
manager would not,4 3as I see it, be free to pick and choose such news
items as it desired.

Justice Stewart echoed this theme in his concurrence and drew a
conclusion:
The First Amendment protects the press from Governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government ....
[Wlere the Government really operating the electronic press, it
would, as my Brother DOUGLAS points out, be prevented by the
of broadcast content and the exerFirst Amendment from selection
4
cise of editorial judgment. 4

The CBS decision is difficult precedent for Muir II because
of fragmentation on the state action question in the private licensee context.4 5 Some members of the Court thought that the government involvement, which is substantially less in CBS than in
Muir II, was state action. 4 If unanimity had been reached on the
state action issue, the decision might have been unfavorable to the
network. However, the denial of certiorari in Muir II indicates
that the CBS adjudication did not hinge on the state action analysis. The Fifth Circuit was, of course, without this guide.
In Muir II, the Fifth Circuit had to decide the state action
issue as well as the proper application of the first amendment to a
public licensee. In this connection, Professor Canby has argued
that the first and most likely place to look for contortions in state
editorial adjudication is the state action requirement.4" Canby
states that "no permissible torture"4 8 of the requirement could
elude state action in public television. The intermingling described
43.
44.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 139, 143.

45. Four Justices, Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Douglas, two of whom indicated
the significance of state action on the outcome of the litigation, found no state action. CBS,
412 U.S. at 97, 148. Two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, found state action and would
not have allowed the editing. Id. at 170. Three Justices, Blackmun, Powell and White,

decided the case on statutory grounds "assuming" or not deciding the threshold question.
Id. at 146-48.
46. Canby, supra note 37, at 1126.
47. Id. at 1125.

48.

Id. at 1126.
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by Justice Douglas leads ineluctably to the conclusion that state
action exists in public television.
The various opinions took several approaches to state action
in the Muir decisions. In Muir H the majority did not address the
existence of state action per se; rather, the opinion assumes state
action and concentrates on its import. The majority rationalized
its decision on non-constitutional grounds of statutory construction.49 Much of the majority opinion was spent developing the
statutory background, 50 which is important for two reasons. The
opinion implicitly recognized Justice Douglas' theory of intertwining, but did not reach the conclusion, as did Justice Stewart, that
content editing is forbidden. 1 For this reason, the state action position of the majority is less important than its final analysis. Also,
the statutory background provided a basis for deference to the
congressional balance already in place.
A second reason for finding state action is found in Barnstone
1:52 even if the public television structure were adequate to divorce
state action from federal funding, none of the safeguards were enacted to protect stations at the state level. The court stated: "the
fox has been asked to guard the henhouse."' 53 The Carnegie Report, which structured an umbrella to prevent "federal" action,
even though ineffective under the Douglas view, offered no shelter
from the blowing rain of local funding. The court correctly applied the analysis because both of the stations in this litigation
were directly funded by the state government;"1 federal funding is
only one avenue of state action.
Judge Markey focused on state control in Muir I. As long as
the station functioned independently of governmental control, the
fact of funding did not create state action. The state ownership
was reason for a vigilant watch, but the function of the station
was essentially private, not governmental. Therefore, the acts of
the station managers were not state action . 5 A different analysis,
Judge Markey intimates, would disallow public television as an
unconstitutional entity.56
This analysis is a variant of the majority's view, stated above,
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Muir H1, 688 F.2d 1037-38, 1043.
Id. at 1038-41.
Id. at 1037-38, 1043.
514 F. Supp. 670.
Id. at 683.
See notes 3 and 10, supra.
656 F.2d at 1018.
Id. at 1018 n.11.
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but it differs fundamentally. The majority said that because of the
function, state action had no effect; Muir I held that because of
the function, state action did not exist. The former, given the
funding structure, is more consistent with ordinary definitions of
state action.
The effect of state action presents a more difficult analytical
problem. The difficulty is capsulized in Chief Justice Burger's profundity in CBS: "[F]or better or worse, editing is what editors are
for; and editing is selection and choice of material. 57 When the
government decides content, the decision can arguably be called
censorship, repugnant to the first amendment. In this sense, Muir
II decided the constitutionality of public television as an entity.
C.

Implications of State Action in Mass Media

The wisdom of governmental involvement in funding an electronic mass media is debatable. Does this violate the first amendment or is it merely a legislative decision based on the public
interest?
Several advantages can be posited for allowing governmental
ownership of the medium.58 First, the untapped educational and
cultural potential seems enormous. Second, public awareness of
political and community issues could be increased. Last, public
television could be an alternative to the commercial proselytizing
of private television.
On the other hand, the presence of a governmental medium
in almost every American living room, if used as a political tool, is
awesomely frightening." It conjures visions of indoctrination, the
ultimate propaganda vehicle. Even subtle doses of indoctrination
over long periods may be cancerous to liberty. Congress presumably considered these reasons in its initial choice not to own the
electronic media. Were there an indicia of these fears becoming
reality in public television, the first amendment would be the
proper antidote; public television as an entity would be
unconstitutional.
But public television is not the forerunner of a ministry of
truth. Congress created public television with laudable intentions,
and the accomplishments and contributions of public television to
date are worthwhile. Public television hints at the medium's pos57. 412 U.S. at 124.
58.
59.

See generally note 32, supra.
Alexander, supra note 25; see Canby, supra note 37, at 1127, 1151.
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sibilities. Television's technology surpasses the average person's
ability to utilize it for more than passing entertainment. Government sometimes takes taxes to do, for public good, that which
could not be supported privately, e.g., public education. When this
exchange of liberty for public benefit occurs, the people must assume a risk equal to, but not to exceed, the benefit derived. In the
public television context, the risk requires deference to minor administrative errors which exist because of the discretionary "public good" standard for programming announced by Congress.
Another serious problem which unfortunately is beyond the
scope of this note, arises from the taxpayer's right to be free from
associating with a point of view with which he disagrees. Freedom
from association implicates a liberty which the courts are beginning to recognize."'
Living in a pluralistic society, the government editor cannot
make programming decisions to please everyone. When broadcasting programs that contain thought provoking material, like Death
of a Princess, a station cannot possibly present every viewpoint,
even if adhering meticulously to a fairness policy. Government, it
may be validly argued, should give information only in its official
capacity; entering the marketplace of ideas just invites problems.
But the problems caused by public television broadcasting involve
propitiousness and not the Constitution. The role of maximizing
benefits while minimizing infringements on liberty, within constitutional limits, falls to the Congress.
Congress addressed the problem by setting a policy of local
autonomy with editorial discretion used by the local authorities
who were to follow the guideline of the "public good." This system contemplates error and gives an administrative review via the
FCC to correct it. 61
The benefits to society thus far outweigh the first amendment
imperfections and the rights of a handful of viewers to program
the station. Perhaps Muir II makes obvious the system's greatest
flaw in that cancellation of Death of a Princess was certainly "ill
advised."' 62 But a single wrong calls for administrative redress or

60. Canby, supra note 37, at 1128; see generally Young & Herbert, PoliticalAssociation Under the Burger Court: Fading Protection, 15 U.C.D.L. REV. 53, 87-93 (198182).
61. Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1047.
62. Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1053 (Rubin, J.,concurring). The distinction being made is
between a single "call" and a policy or practice of poor choices. The former does not require intervention.
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political rethinking from Congress about the system's operation.
The majority in Muir H recommended the FCC as the correct
forum.6 3

To declare that editorial discretion is unconstitutional would
vitiate public television. Programming would be either so bland no
one would care to watch it or its function would be merely that of
a public stump to air personal opinions for an alotted time. Either
would destroy the substantial benefit society now enjoys from public television.
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

A.

The Government as Speaker

The majority in Muir H found that the government was the
speaker and, as such, had the right to control the content of its
own expression.6 4 To carry out ordinary governmental functions,
the government must speak; a mute government could not be effective. In its governmental capacity, it would be ludicrous to say
that there can be no point of view expressed. It is little less ridiculous to contend that one private person could decide the content.
Government would no longer be a democracy.
The plaintiffs argued in Muir II that the first amendment
placed duties on the government and afforded no rights to the government,6 5 apparently in an attempt to capitalize on the statements made by Justice Stewart in CBS."6 The courts, however,
found the argument irrelevant to the issue of private parties compelling programming. 7 Justice Stewart's opinion itself counterbalances the viewer's argument: "[G]overnment is not restrained
by the First Amendment for controlling its own expression ....
'[Tihe purpose of the First Amendment is to protect private expression and nothing in the guarantee precludes the government
63. See Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1047-48. There are a number of administrative sanctions that the FCC could apply if the licensee engages in improper programming. These
range from an admonition to a denial of license renewal.
64. Muir H, 688 F.2d at 1044. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-4 (1978).
65. Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1038.
66. See text accompanying note 44, supra.
67. While this argument of the plaintiffs may be essentially correct it in no
way resolves the issue before us. To find that the government is without First
Amendment protection is not to find the government is prohibited from
speaking or that private individuals have the right to limit or control the
expression of government.
Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1038.
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from controlling its own expression or that of its agents.' 86Further, in a penetrating footnote, the Fifth Circuit revealed the policy underlying the majority's decision in Muir II:
Government expression, being unprotected by the First Amendment,
may be subject to legislative limitation which would be impermissible if sought to be applied to private expression. Yet there is nothing
to suggest that, absent such limitations, government is restrained
from speaking any more than are private persons. Freedom of expression is the norm in our society, for government (if not restrained) and for the people. 9

The majority decided that the stations that had cancelled
Death of a Princess had complete discretion to program on the
basis of the statutory mandate.7" The court's only application of
the first amendment was that a government licensee could have
restraints placed on it which would not be constitutional as applied to private licensees because the first amendment would limit,
but not protect, public television. The majority gave no examples
of what "restrictions" might be imposed, but perhaps the court
contemplated a more serious political intervention that would activate constitutional restrictions: a move away from an alternative,
cultural approach to television and toward being an arm of the
government. If this is what the majority meant, it should have
articulated the principle.
B.

A Functional Analysis: The Public Forum Doctrine

Much of the difficulty surrounding the Muir II case derives
from the district court's holding in Barnstone I.7 The district
court found that the originators of Death of a Princess were
speakers in Barnstone I and that the characteristics of a public
forum were met by public television.7 2 The cancellation was therefore a prior restraint and a violation of the first amendment.73
Traditionally, the public forum doctrine has been used to adjudicate cases in which a willing speaker sought a right of access
to public property to speak.74 How closely analogous a speaker's
68.

CBS, 412 U.S. at 139 n.7, quoting T.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION 700 (1970).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1038 n.12.
Id. at 1038.
514 F. Supp. at 689.
Barnstone 1, 514 F. Supp. at 689.
Id. at 690-91.
See generally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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chosen forum is to traditional public forums can be a decisive factor in determining the freedom accorded the speaker. 75 Justice
Roberts first announced the public forum doctrine in his concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO.76 The heart of public forum policy
confirms that speech cannot be denied, regardless of content, in
places traditionally held open for public comment. Although the
accuracy of the history in Justice Roberts' sweeping statement is
questionable, the public recognizes freedoms accorded in certain
places which cannot be abridged."
As the doctrine matured, the public forum issue became a
problem of definition. Once the courts labeled the place a public
forum, adjudication normally followed the pattern of allowing the
speech.78 The historical approach, however, restricted public forum analysis to instances where the property was recognized, historically, as well suited for communications, which left little room
for expansion.
The Warren Court avoided the narrow precedent and expanded the doctrine through a right of access test, 79 instead of the
Hague historical test. In other words, the definition of a public
forum depended on a person's right to be in a particular place; if
access were available, then the speaker could use reasonable
methods to communicate while there. This expansion led to
greater protection of free speech rights. Regulation of speech in a
public forum is limited to time, place and manner restrictions to
promote efficient use of facilities and to maintain order.8 0 Content
of speech cannot be regulated in a public forum. 8 The Warren
Court even applied the public forum doctrine to private property;82 this was the zenith of the expansive approach.

973 (2d ed. 1983).
75. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), where the Court
noted: "[Tlhe nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained
important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to the
speech in question." Id. at 302-03.
76, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring).
77. Id.

78. See Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 247 (1976). In recognizing this trend,
the author argues for non-absolutism in public forum adjudication and a pragmatic balancing approach using a compelling interest test to safeguard against government content
control.
79. See Zillman and lmwinkelried, The Legacy of Greer v. Spoclc- The Public Fo-

rum Doctrine and the Principle of the Military's Neutrality, 65 GEo. L.J. 773, 777-79
(1977).
80.
81.
82.

J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 74 at 977.
Id. See also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968),
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Even during this broadening process, however, the courts allowed limitations of expressive behavior on public property, if necessary, to preserve the property to its intended use. Mere government ownership does not classify publicly owned property as a
83
public forum. As Justice Black noted in Adderley v. Florida:
"The state, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated."'" By invoking this limitation, the Court rejected the prison property on which demonstrations were held in
Adderley as a public forum. The intended use exception goes beyond time, place and manner restrictions since it presupposes a
government-owned place where speech could be curtailed based on
content if the purpose of the property is detrimentally affected by
the speech and the public interest in the preserved purpose outweighs the first amendment value involved.
With the advent of the Burger Court, the public forum doctrine began to contract. The Court's decisions showed a trend toward the older historical approach or at least a broader definition
of the dedicated use exception. 8" Given the Court's decisions in
Greer v. Spock,8 where the public forum argument was rejected
in spite of a general right of access found to the streets of a military base, and, more recently, in United States Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Association,17 where the Court decided that mail-boxes are not public forums even though they are
used primarily for the dissemination of information, there can be
little doubt that the doctrine is now being applied selectively. 8
Public forum status in electronic media depends on a
speaker's right of access. 9 The right of access is an indispensable
element, for how can one be denied speech in a place where he has

overruled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
83. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
84. Id. at 47.
85. See Zillman and Imwinkelried, supra note 79.
86. 424 U.S. 828 (1976); But see Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
87. 453 U.S. 114 (1981). See also Lehman, 418 U.S. 298 (The card space at issue
would have been used for dissemination of ideas.).
88. But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (upholding religious activity on
a university campus under the public forum doctrine).
89. But see Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L.R. 117 (1975). The author argues for a minimum right of access
in contrast with the court's conception of equal access. The latter seems to be more of an
estoppel principle or is at least in the same genre. The author's thesis is that the first
amendment requires an affirmative right of access if the forum is open. However, the
threshold hurdle of classification must be met.
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no right to be?"0 The public forum doctrine does not create a
Hyde Park of every publicly owned place that may in some way
be used to convey a message. 9
This is a pragmatic limitation. The efficiency of government
may not properly be weighed against the liberty of free speech
except where the right must be limited in order for the benefit to
accrue. The limitation assumes that were public television thrown
open, the result would be rigorous competition for free speaking
space. One may safely assume that were public television defined
as a public forum, there would be a congregation vying for an
allotment of time. Government, in that situation, could not suppress the ideas merely because it disagreed with the content of the
message. 92 To foreclose the operation of public television by allowing a cacophony of uninhibited speech would be ironic.9 s Government by consent requires that the people give up a degree of
liberty in exchange for public good. Therefore, speech should be
' but
"robust and wide open" 94
the public forum doctrine is limited
by the public's compelling interest in having quality education
programming.
To have a colorable claim under the public forum doctrine,
the viewers in Muir II had to assert a right of access. In CBS v.
Democratic National Committee, the plaintiff sought limited access to a private licensee's network which had a policy banning
the sale of air time for broadcasting political advertisements.9 6
The plaintiffs claimed that the Red Lion fairness doctrine,9" allowing response time for personal attacks, had created a limited
right of access to broadcast mediums.9 7 The Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine because it promoted the public interest

90. Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968) (dealt with a right of access to publish a law review article which the editor had
rejected at a state university); see also Advocates for the Arts v. Thompson, 532 F.2d 792
(lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (rejection of funding for a literary magazine; the court held that the magazine had no affirmative right to the money); Houchins v.
KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
91. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
92. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
93. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 103 (citing 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS

640, 641 (1947)).

94.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

95.

CBS, 412 U.S. at 97.

96. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The fairness doctrine,
in general, has been applied to give a right of access to rebut by presenting an opposing
view. Compare CBS, 412 U.S. at 123. The Court recognizes that there are not two, but a
multitude of views on almost any issue.
97. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 74, at 894-902.
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and had at least arguably articulable standards to be administered
by the FCC.98 The majority in CBS reasoned that a limited right
of access, however, was antithetical to the broadcast licensee's autonomy. 9 A right of access for everyone would place broadcasting
rights in the hands of politically irresponsible speakers rather than
professionals with statutory mandate, enforced through the
FCC, 10° to program for public good. Congress rejected common
carrier status for broadcasting licensees '1 and built in administrative accountability as a condition for continued licensure. Thus the
first amendment balance relies on administrative oversight.
FCC v. Midwest Video °2 reinforces the denial of a right of
access. The Supreme Court invalidated an FCC regulation which
required cable television franchises to have a minimum number of
public access channels. The Court deferred to Congress; the statute denying common carrier status prevailed over a regulation in
conflict with the statute.
Precedent requires a right of access before a fathomable
claim can be made. Nevertheless, the Muir H plaintiffs did not
seek a right of access,10 3 but rather looked to a quasi-public forum
theory to compel broadcast of Death of a Princess. The court reasoned that without a right of access the plaintiffs had no rights
under the public forum doctrine and refused to accept the plaintiffs' position. 10" Likewise, the court disagreed with the district
court's opinion in Barnstone I, in which the court held that the
two salient features of a public forum had been met: public ownership of property; and the use of that property for the dissemina10 5
tion of ideas.
The Muir II majority used an amalgamation of the historical
and access public forum tests: "A facility is a public forum only if
it is designed to provide a general public right of access to its use,
or if such public access has historically existed and is not incompatible with the facility's primary activity."0' Since the test for
public forums as promulgated required a right of access, then a
98.
99.
100.
101.
affirmative
CBS, Inc.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376.
412 U.S. at 120.
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 3(h). But see 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (creating a limited right of
and not merely responsive access for candidates for federal office). See also
v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
688 F.2d at 1041.
Id.
514 F. Supp. at 683-89.
Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1042.

19831

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-EDITORIAL

DISCRETION

149

fortiori, the plaintiffs had no claim. The quasi-public forum argument did not convince the court to delete the access requirement.
The majority relied on the authority of CBS to find that the station's first amendment rights would be contracted by allowing
right of access,' 0 7 following the rationale that accountable editors
best served the public interest. Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights' 8 and Greenburgh'0 9 harmonize with the court's decision
since both of those cases contain the combination of government
ownership with the primary purpose of idea dissemination, but did
not implicate the public forum doctrine.
The primary function of the station was to program in the
public interest, not to become a soapbox for the community-the
station invited the viewer to watch or not to watch, but an individual viewer had no right to program the station.1"0 Thus, even if
the public forum factors had been prima facie indicated, public
television, because of its peculiar function, seemingly falls within
the dedicated use exception.
Judge Rubin's concurrence is a variation on the public forum
analysis but the focus is different. He analyzes the case by looking
at public television as a specific informational function of the government (e.g., a governmentally published tax manual) rather
than a general news conduit. 1 ' The former allows content control
based on reasoning not unlike the dedicated use exception; the latter is constitutionally required to be neutral."' This rationale requires public television to be more closely analogous to a published pamphlet than to the commercial television network." 3 The
majority opinion reasons conversely and more logically. Public television is not purely informational and surely need not be to comply with the first amendment.
C.

The ProceduralApproach

The basic procedural approach advocated by the plaintiffs in
Muir If was that of Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle.",
Under that analysis, if a plaintiff proved that the programming
107. Id.
108. 418 U.S. 298. See supra note 87.
109. 453 U.S. 114.
110. Muir I, 688 F.2d at 1042.
111. Id. at 1050.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The case involved a dismissal of a teacher for expressive
behavior protected by the first amendment.
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was motivated by an intent to suppress ideas, the burden would
shift to the government to show that the program would have been
cancelled for some independent reason, consistent with the public
interest and the first amendment.1 1 5 Judge Johnson's dissent in
Muir II, and the concurrence in the Fifth Circuit panel adjudication of Barnstone I accepted this approach." 6 The majority in
Muir H rejected the Mt. Healthy test." 7
On first blush the shifting approach is appealing: the decision
to cancel Death of a Princess was so blatantly political that it
seems to require the government to come forward with a plausible
explanation. However, the reasoning of the majority is more
sound. Setting in place this analytical formula, based on blatant
facts, incites an avalanche of claims. Even though the original
burden would be on the plaintiff, the public television system
would be hurled in to the litigious conundrum of what is "political." The administrative burden of having every decision litigated
would be more than public television could endure.
The district court in Barnstone P118 took a second procedural
approach which erected even more difficult barriers than Mt.
Healthy. The district court applied Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad,1 1 9 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a decision to cancel a theatrical production of "Hair" in a municipal
auditorium because it contained anti-establishment messages. 20
Conrad makes all prior restraints presumptively infirm, and requires the government to run a procedural gauntlet to rebut the
presumption."
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings to declare the speech unprotected is on the censor. Second,
prior restraint is allowed only for a short time to preserve the status quo. Third, a speedy and final judicial determination is required.12 2 The Court found the suppression of "Hair" invalid
based on these procedures. 21
115. Compare, Id. at 284-87.
116. Muir 1I,688 F.2d at 1059; Barnstone 1, 660 F.2d at 141 (Reavley, J., concurring). The opinion states that the decision, if based on suppression of a point of view, is
presumptively unconstitutional even if no impermissible motive is found. See also Muir II,
688 F.2d at 1060.
117. 688 F.2d at 1044.
118. 514 F. Supp. at 683-89.
119. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
120. Id. at 564. But see Justice White's dissent where he compares the cultural
worth of "Hair" to that of Aristophanes' work. Id.
121. Id. at 558.
122. Id. at 560; see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
123. See Conrad, 420 U.S. at 563. (Justice Douglas characterizes the decision as a
procedural band aid. He would have allowed no content regulation.).
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Conrad presented similar facts to Muir H: a publicly owned
facility which is customarily used for communications had been
denied use for dissseminating a particular message. Conrad's test,
wielded in broad strokes and strictly applied to every editorial decision public television made, would litigate public television into
oblivion. Muir H glossed Conrad with necessary pragmatism for
operating public television and properly limited its scope. Public
television simply cannot go to court every time a programming
1 24
decision is made.
As a second distinction, in Conrad a willing speaker sought
access to a forum controlled by the government, whereas in Muir
II, a listener sought to compel an unwilling speaker, the government. The outcome of Muir II might have been, but not necessarily should have been, different if the program's originators had
sought a right of access.1 25 However, precedent from CBS, as examined, made it unlikely that a right of access was present. Also,
the Supreme Court decided in Conrad that the auditorium was a
public forum. 26 The Muir H majority followed the specific congressional enactment and did not treat public television as a public forum. The statute relied on has no analogue relating to municipal auditoriums.
D.

The Government's Role as Editor

Governmental editing of printed publications provides fertile
ground for exploration of judicial treatment of the state as editor.
An examination and reconciliation of these cases, to the extent
that they are apposite because of their medium, is necessary to
complete this analysis.
Bazaar v. Fortune127 concerned the withholding from publication of a magazine which contained material written by students under supervision of an English professor 128 because it contained words which administrators of the University of Mississippi
thought were unbecoming to the image of the University. The system of funding was unusual in that the magazine was supposed to
pay back from sales the original production costs, with a deficit
124. See Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1044.
125. The interesting omission of fact made by the Barnstone I court was that the
program was originated through SPC funding. Thus, it seems the government was also the
"speaker" in its pristine sense, not just a conduit.
126. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555.
127. 476 F.2d 570, modified, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973).
128. Bazaar, 476 F.2d at 572.
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being underwritten by the English Department."2 9 Nevertheless,
the Fifth Circuit found state action and struck down the administrative decision to cancel the publication,13 reasoning that limiting words was only one step away from limiting ideas. 1 '
Several enigmatic suggestions were made by the court in deciding the case. For instance, consider the statement that, "This
opinion [does not] mean to say that no language or conduct short
of legal obscenity can be regulated by a college or university."' 3 2
However, the court stated paradoxically: "The first amendment
. . . took the power to make such judgment out of the hands of
the state."'3 3
The inconsistent policy of the administration toward the very
words sought to be restrained may be one explanation of the decision. These words appeared in works required or recommended by
the school faculty.13 1 Perhaps, too, the court scrutinized the decision more carefully because the university plays a fundamental
part in the growth of thought in free society and courts are more
circumspect of suppression of ideas in the university context. Publication of avant garde literature furthers the university's purpose
of broadening educational exposure. However, given that the university necessarily makes content decisions daily, drawing a principled line for judicial intervention is practically impossible and
will have to be done on a case by case basis.'3 5 Also, the framers
of the Constitution gave textual sanctity to a free press whereas

129. Id. at 571-72.
130. See also Brooks v. Auburn University, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1979). The
court found a constitutional violation in the cancellation of funding for a speaker on campus on the basis of a content based discrimination.
131. Bazaar, 476 F.2d at 576.
132. Id. at 580.
133. Id. at 579.
134. Id. at 577-78. This solace in itself is bittersweet in that the constitutional principle on government editorializing has been decided on grounds not unlike estoppel.
135. See Canby, supra note 37. Professor Canby in his article offers an explanation
of this genre of cases based upon the structure of the editorial system used. He says the
real necessity for strong first amendment scrutiny arises when there is outside interference
with the previously delegated editorial functions. His thesis is that editing involves by its
very nature content control which must be allowed in order to promote a designated purpose and efficiency, yet the exercise of content control must not be sporadically exercised
by the delegating authority in a manner that displaces the delegatee's editorial function.
The delegator should only make subject matter proscriptions which are prospective and
general. The superficial distinction may be quickly noted. If an editor has the authority to
delegate, then supervise, there is no analytically principled distinction to sporadic exercise
of the authority. This would be a functional liability. Again this is a mutation of estoppel
and should have no place in first amendment jurisprudence. This analysis also fosters surreptitious action and the first amendment principle involved should not rest on ingenuity.
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136
the electronic media must be sanctified circumstantially.
Bazaar is further puzzling because of the rehearing modification 137 which allowed a disclaimer to be stamped on the outside of
the magazine denying an imprimatur of the University on its content. As Judge Bell's dissent aptly points out, this judicial afterthought has a vitiating effect on the entire opinion because it
evades the issue of government sponsorship." 8 May the University
merely refuse to sponsor initially if any indication of first amendment problems exists? Reciprocally, may the government be compelled to sponsor communications as attempted in Muir H?
Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson' 39 considered the question
of whether a state's refusal to fund a publication due to content
appearing in a previous issue is constitutionally impermissible.
The governor's council in charge of fund disbursal to the artistic
community allocated a grant-in-aid to a literary magazine. The
council withheld an additional grant because the book contained
an "item of filth."1 40 The publishers unsuccessfully sought judicial
relief based on a prior restraint. 4 ' The First Circuit reasoned that
the plaintiffs did not have an absolute right to the grant and that
discretion of the council was the best way to obtain managerial
efficiency.' 4 2 Expressing regret that the managers of the money
had used discretion poorly by basing their decision to cancel the
grant solely on one poem, the court held, with apparent reluctance, that there was no constitutional ground for relief.'43 In
short, the court concluded that artistic standards do not lend
themselves to first amendment adjudication.'" Thus, judges
should defer to the discretion of those who have been chosen
through the political process to make these decisions."'
The Muir H majority chose not to align itself with the Bazaar precedent, but did not state why. It would have been super-

136. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
137. 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973).
138. Id. at 228.
139. 532 F.2d 792 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
140. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 793.
141. Id. at 795.
142. Id. at 796.
143. Id. at 797.
144. Id.; see also Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 920 (1968). The plaintiff sought to have his law review article published claiming
covert discrimination against his conservative viewpoint, but the court deferred to the editor's discretion. To decide the case otherwise would have made constitutional principle an
evidentiary second-guessing proposition. The courts cannot use hindsight to second-guess
inherently subjective decisions.
145. See Note, supra note 34, at 1180, 1181.
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fluous in one sense because of the decision's tenor towards government speech. On the other hand, failing to face squarely all the
issues and precedent detracts from Muir II's credibility. For that
reason, the problems raised by the dissent concerning the Bazaar
case and its progeny should have been discussed by the majority.
Judge Johnson, dissenting, found public television editing indistinguishable from censoring a school magazine or rescinding funding
for a speaker based on the content of his message. 4"
Valid, but not altogether convincing, differences distinguish
Muir H from Bazaar. First, the unique forum of television should
never be forgotten. "[Iln broadcasting every compulsion carries
restraint, every compelled program necessarily replacing and thus
restraining the program that would otherwise have been chosen." 1 4 7 Retreat to this begins to sound tautologous; nevertheless,
speech is often classified based on its context. There can be some
content regulation if the message is electronically broadcasted
even if the language is merely indecent (not confined to accepted
moral standards) rather than legally obscene. The Supreme Court
in FCC v. Pacifica4 8 relied on the invasiveness of the medium and
the government's interest in protecting children to justify a sanction against the broadcaster which had aired a satiristic view of
"dirty" words by humorist George Carlin. Content and context
are equally weighty.
Second, deference, or at least great weight, should be given to
the prescribed congressional balance for public television whereas
none has been undertaken for written publications. Third, the
character of the university and its traditional role in wide-open
access to ideas should be considered. However, public television
also attempts to broaden horizons. Thus, the distinction is unsatisfying. Last, university publications circulate to only a few, most of
whom, it may be reasonably assumed, are adults, while electronic
broadcasting is much more pervasive. This distinction is ambivalent: it justifies the government's interest in protecting particular
classes of persons such as children. But, on the other hand, once
education is accepted as the function of both the university and
public television, dissemination of Death of a Princessfurthers the
same purpose as forward looking literature.
Bazaar and Advocates for the Arts are examples of the di-

146.
147.
148.

See Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1059 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Muir i, 656 F.2d at 1024 (footnote omitted).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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verse treatment of state editorial cases: the range is from abdication to active intervention. The courts face a Hobson's choice, accentuated when the facts show an incumbent bias, of allowing
what is arguably censorship or crippling necessary editorial functions with judicial substitution.
Professor Karst has suggested that the reconciliation lies in
the state's compelling interest in quality editing by government
agents. 4 9 He states that government or private media without editing would be a "printed bulletin board.'

1 50

His requirement that

editing be done in a professional manner,'' is desirable but superficial. Even the most conscientious professional will never
please everyone. Karst properly identifies the problem as one of
personnel but uses this as a rationalization for judicial intervention. On the contrary, professionalism of editors is outside judicial
competence and should activate the political process. When editors make bad choices, they should be replaced. Perhaps the real
problem is one of degree, i.e., how egregious and obvious does the
decision have to be before action is taken?
E.

Cancellation v. Non-Programming: The Right to See

Board of Education v. Pico' raised new issues: is there a
constitutional right to receive information, and if so, does the government have an affirmative duty to provide this information?
Pico involved a school board's removal of allegedly unfit books
from high school and junior high libraries. The Supreme Court
said in Stanley v. Georgia15 - that a citizen had a right to see material in the privacy of his home even if the material is obscene.
However, Justice Brennan mustered only three votes to support a
plurality opinion in Pico, upholding the concept of a right to receive information. The plurality concluded that the right to receive information is "ineluctable," drawing an economic analogy
to a market place with all sellers and no buyers. 54 Justice Brennan concluded that the right to receive information was a "necessary predicate" to the recipients' "meaningful" exercise of free
speech.'55 The plurality narrowed the holding to library books' 5 6
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Karst, supra note 78, at 256.
Id.
Id. at 258.
457 U.S. 853 (1982).

153.

394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

154.
155.

Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.

Id.
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(i.e., optional material) and gave special protection to the library.
Pico split the Court, making it difficult to ascertain any coherent policy. 157 Four justices refused to accept the concept of a
'
Justice
right to receive information from the government. 58
Blackmun concurred in the judgment but strictly on the basis of
finding content-based censorship, stopping short of endorsing a
59
right to receive.'
Justice Brennan's distinction between the removal of books
is sophistry. Under his "right to
and non-acquisition of books'
receive information" theory there should be no differentiation, yet
he does not apply the standard equally to both. What is to prevent
the acquisitions librarian from simply never buying books that, in
his personal judgment, students should not read? How is that any
different from taking a book off the shelf? In either case, the book
is unavailable. As Chief Justice Burger noted, timing is no ground
on which to adjudicate a constitutional principle. 6 ' Pico allows
editors to do inconspicuously what is unconstitutional if obvious.
Justice Brennan, although recognizing the strong degree of
deference usually accorded a local school board, stated that judicial intervention is justified only if "basic constitutional values"
are "directly and sharply" implicated. 63 If the school board's decision in Pico implicates fundamental rights, then the school has a
constitutional duty to buy every book any student may conceivably want to read; this, of course, is absurd.
In a remarkably similar case, President's Council, District 25
v. Community School Board, No. 25,163 which involved book removal from a junior high library, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took an opposite approach stating:
The administration of any library whether it be a university or particularly a public junior high school, involves a constant process of
selection and winnowing based not only on educational needs but
financial and architectural realities. To suggest that the shelving or
unshelving of books presents a constitutional issue, particularly

156. Id. at 869.
157. See Muir 1I, 688 F.2d at 1045 n.30. (The court found no guidance from Pico's
multiple opinions.).
158. Pico, 457 U.S. at 887. (Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, is joined by Justices
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor.).
159. Id. at 878.
160. Id. at 870-71.
161. Id. at 892.
162. Id. at 866 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
163. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1979).
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where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or
thought, is a proposition we cannot accept.'"

Except for the medium, Pico and President's Council are
very similar to Muir II. All involved content editing, removal as
opposed to non-acquisition, and intervention from a party not ordinarily involved directly in editorial discretion. The diversity of
opinion in Pico is indicative of the complex problems involved
when first amendment rights compete. The right to receive ideas
concept is best limited to cases where the government acts as a
suppressor, not an editor, because holding that the government
has an affirmative duty to provide the information is unharnessable. The majority in Muir II distinguished Pico on the contextual differences between a school library and a public television
station, deferring to the congressional balance of first amendment
rights in the broadcasting area. 6 5 The Muir H decision is not eloquent in distinguishing Pico, but the distinctions avoided repetition of a less than definitive and ill-founded decision by the Supreme Court.
F.

The Trivialization Effect

The government in its role as editor of public television
should be assiduously watched and afforded less deference than its
private counterparts. 6 1 When the government edits, the people
have more at stake than when the private media edits. Is the first
amendment the proper adjudicatory tool? The court said in Muir
I:
It would demean the first amendment to find that it required a public referendum on every programming decision made every day by
every public television station solely because the station is owned
and partially funded by the state government. It would be equally
Draconian to hold on that sole ground that programming decisions
of public broadcasters constitute government censorship, with the
concomitant necessity of declaring that public television stations exercising editorial freedom
are themselves constitutionally
16 7
prohibited.

164.
165.
contended
166.
167.

Id. at 293.
Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1045-46. But see Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1051 (Judge Rubin
that his functional approach was in tune with all the opinions in Pico.).
But see Note, supra note 34, at 1179.
Muir 1, 656 F.2d at 1017-18.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4:133

The trivialization effect has been expressly recognized by the
Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, where the
Court said, "[I]n these circumstances, the managerial decision
does not rise to the dignity of First Amendment violation. 1 6 8
The choice in Muir II was to allow editorial discretion, poor as it
may have been, or subject the first amendment to the trivialization
an opposite decision would impose.
Using the first amendment prudently prohibits demeaning application. As Judge Markey said: "The First Amendment is not a
fetish." 1 6 9 Insubstantial violations should not trigger the first
amendment-that would be overkill-but the threshold on so fundamental a principle should be low. Were the government even
arguably trying to set up an "official news agency" the first
amendment could purge the government's new arm. In the
meantime, the people must tolerate poor governmental editing, or
use administrative or political action for recourse. Congress created the opportunity, and exercise of the democratic vent, political
action, constitutes the most direct route.
CONCLUSION

The majority of the Fifth Circuit decided to defer to the administrative decision to cancel Death of a Princess when challenged on first amendment grounds. Cancellation was apparently
politically motivated and therefore detrimental to the public good,
which public television is required to consider above all else. Public television's infusion with public funds denoted state action
which raised difficult questions of first amendment application.
The benefit of public television countervails minor editorial errors
for which the people assume risk when their representatives undertake such a project for public benefit. Public television is not a
functional arm of the government; if that were the case, the first
amendment would forbid its existence. The government was the
speaker in Muir II and had the right to control its own speech.
The viewers who brought suit against the stations had no right of
access to the stations and, therefore, public television, even though
owned by the government and used for communications, is not a
public forum. The majority failed to adequately address precedents which had disallowed governmental editing of written mate-
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rial, even though plausible grounds for distinction of those cases
existed. The majority correctly rejected procedural approaches
posited during the litigation as being overburdening to necessary
daily editorial functions required for public television.
The first amendment is demeaned when applied to trivial
matters which weakens application when the first amendment really counts. When other methods sufficiently redress a problem,
prudent courts should reserve the first amendment. When editorial
discretion is exercised in a flagrantly poor manner, especially involving blatant politically-oriented decisions, deference to that
judgment is difficult. The courts must not succumb to intervention
merely because the decision is bad and thereby set precedent
which will ruin a workable, albeit imperfect, public television system substantially benefiting the public. Deference was the only
workable posture for the court in Muir II since the case adjudicated competing first amendment rights. The cancellation of
Death of a Princess was deplorable but the problems it has raised
should call for review of the decision-makers through the political
process. The court system is incompetent to judge matters of subjective taste and should not be called on to be public television's
super-editors.
Robin L. Roberts

